Smart contracts of Fantastic Protocol are audited by Obelisk Auditing
Findings further explanation from the team:
The combination of preventing the Oracle from generating prices if its last update is older than 12 hours and preventing drifts of more than 10% between the spot price and the TWAP should provide resistance against extreme price manipulation.
We will deploy another Timelock with longer minimum delay.
Especially now while we are looking for ways to add
daily minting caps/stops
dynamic supply ceilings
as already mentioned in this announcement. ( to achieve TWAP > 1, CR < 100% and more burned $FXM and $SNOWY)
As recommended by the auditor, we will add a longer timelock at a later time.
The oracle requires maintenance (changing DEX, change to Chainlink or other oracle services, etc.) so it cannot be fixed. Price of the oracle if not updated will make the pool temporarily paused, therefore it will not affect any logical calculations.
Description was updated
Rename from exit() to emergencyWithdraw()
emergencyWithdraw() function is not available for locked (8-week locking time) tokens.
We will deploy another Timelock with longer minimum delay.
With the duration, we will increase the delay over time. At the beginning, things need to be fine tuned so we can't use a long delay (like 72 hours)
